

















162Variation in the fees of medical specialists:
problems, causes, solutions
Ian S McRae1, Kees C van Gool2Greater transparency in setting charges may be the
most efficient way to rein in excessive feesrticles in this issue of the MJA1,2 and elsewhere3-5 have
reported significant variation in the fees charged byAspecialist physicians and surgeons. These variations raise
questions about excessive health care costs, as well as about
barriers to access for patients.2,4,5
That costs are barriers to medical care in Australia has been re-
ported by 8% of people who needed to see amedical specialist and
by 19%of those needing to see a general practitioner.5 International
studies have also found that cost is a barrier for those needing
medical specialist or general practice care; Australian prices
generally fall in themiddle range of the countries surveyed, but are
among the highest for patients with certain chronic conditions.6
Financial barriers are more significant for poorer, sicker people,
and for those in remote areas,7 and in the long run may lead to
poorer health and greater costs.
The causes of fee variations are essentially market-related. Supply
and demand conditions vary across geographic and specialty mar-
kets, and areas with fewer doctors are likely to face higher fees.7
Price variations are also a symptom of the uncompetitive nature of
markets for certain medical specialist services, so that some doctors
are able to chargewell above the levels commonly charged for these
services.Whether supply is adequate depends on demand, and this
in turn depends on the patients’ clinical needs, their ability and
willingness topay (both strongly linked to income),3 and their ability
to find alternative care (in public hospitals, for instance). Supply—
the services that will be provided at a given price — depends on
doctor numbers, the hours they are prepared to work, and on their
attitudes to charging, including views on altruism.
The future supply of medical specialists will be influenced by the
growing number of graduates from medical schools, subject to
specialist training capacities.8 Increasing medical specialist
numbers would be expected to lead to increased bulk-billing and
lower average fees, but may also increase the volume of services.
Other consequences may be difficult to predict, including changes
to employment arrangements, such as greater willingness to
become salaried medical officers.
Some of the proposed solutions for reducing excessive fees and
high co-payments are unlikely to have a substantial impact. For
example, there are calls to remove the Medical Benefits Schedule
(MBS) fee freeze.2 However, evidence from general practice9 and
the MBS safety net10 suggest that increasing the levels of rebates
would have minimal impact on out-of-pocket costs, as doctors are
aware of what price “the market will bear”.1 More importantly,
such changes are unlikely to reduce variations within medical
specialties, or to reduce the extreme out-of-pocket fees charged by
some practitioners.1 Australian National University, Canberra, ACT. 2Centre for Health Economics Research an
doi: 10.5694/mja16.01297 j See Perspective, p. 153; Research, p. 176Other self-regulatory solutions, such as professional colleges
offering education about “reasonable” fee-setting (eg, the Royal
Australasian College of Surgeons Code of Conduct11) have, in
practice, not constrained fees. Colleges may find this role easier
were government price setting more transparent and rules for
setting MBS schedule fees more explicit.
Easier access to information may induce greater competition. Pa-
tients have little opportunity to verify claims of higher quality care
by medical specialists, and it is difficult to shop around to find the
best price. Unverified quality claims can lead to extensive price
variation, despite there being little evidence that quality is corre-
lated with price.2 Information for patients could be improved
by a website where medical specialists report their fees (eg, myDr.
com.au, healthdirect.gov.au), enabling patients and referring GPs
to make clinically and financially informed choices. Equally
importantly, transparent pricing could lead to price competition
between medical specialists.
Extreme out-of-pocket costs could also be reduced by regulatory
incentives and constraints within the Medicare system. Noting the
constitutional need to avoid civil conscription, options could
include removal of access toMedicare rebates for a service if the fee
is extreme; introducing incentives, similar to GP bulk-billing in-
centives, that reward medical specialists for charging certain pa-
tient populations specified fees; or throughmore radicalmeasures,
such asmakingMedicare an opt-in system for doctorswho agree to
meet particular charging guidelines.
Variations in fees charged by particular medical and surgical
specialist groups can generate barriers for patients. History sug-
gests self-regulation is unlikely to change this situation, and
increasing MBS rebates will have little effect. While the increasing
numbers of specialists should put downward pressure on prices,d Evaluation, University of Technology, Sydney, NSW. Ian.s.Mcrae@anu.edu.au j
Editorialthe scale of this pressure is difficult to predict. If the government
wants to improve the affordability of medical specialist services
without incurring large, uncontrollable costs, direct regulation is
one option, but one that is likely to generate considerable debate.
Improving the transparency of pricing could increase competition
and place downward pressure on unreasonable fee-setting, and
mayprovide themost affordable and fair approach to the problem.
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